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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
Grassey
and Turner: Burn before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Central Intel

find a single plan laid out in such complete detail.
RICHMOND M. LLOYD

William B. Ruger Chair of
National Security Economics
Naval War College

Turner, Stansfield. Burn before Reading: Presidents,
CIA Directors, and Central Intelligence. New York:
Hyperion, 2005. 319pp. $23.95

Presumably Stansfield Turner did not
devise the nonsensical title of this history
of the DCI’s (Director, Central Intelligence) relationship with the president of
the United States.
In twelve chapters on chief executives
from Franklin D. Roosevelt through
George W. Bush, Turner discusses the
nineteen men who headed America’s intelligence organization. “Within six
months of Pearl Harbor, FDR’s enthusiasm for ‘Wild Bill’ [Donovan’s] ‘innovative thinking’ had evaporated,” Turner
writes, noting that Donovan was never
given access to the ULTRA/MAGIC
code-breaking program, and he regularly
lost struggles with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and J. Edgar Hoover.
In January 1946, Harry Truman created
the Central Intelligence Group and appointed Sidney Souers as the first director of central intelligence, with simple
expectations: “to keep him personally
well-informed of all that was going on in
the outside world.” By September 1949,
however, the CIA had not been privy to
Atomic Energy Commission information, so the day after Truman learned
that the Soviet Union had exploded its
first atomic bomb, he read Intelligence
Memorandum 225: “The earliest possible date by which the USSR might be
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expected to produce an atomic bomb is
mid-1950 and the most probable date is
mid-1953.”
Turner recounts subsequent intelligence
failures, but because the manuscript was
submitted to the CIA for security review,
few readers should be surprised by this
history.
While most facts are familiar, Turner’s
thesis is that the director of Central Intelligence serves the president in two capacities: leading the CIA in providing
unbiased intelligence; and heading the
intelligence community, “fifteen federal
agencies, offices, and bureaus within the
executive branch.” Turner evaluates the
eighteen DCIs before Porter Goss on
how each performed both tasks, including his own service under Jimmy Carter.
If Turner is frank about errors he made,
he excoriates his successor, Bill Casey.
“Overall, I found this transition group to
be as unbalanced, opinionated, and unwilling to listen as any group I have ever
encountered. They came to their task
with their minds made up, and no facts
were going to change their conclusions.”
Fifteen blistering pages recount Casey’s
politicization of the agency and obsession with covert actions, culminating in
his leading Ollie North to undertake
“two highly illegal operations—selling
arms to Iran and funneling the money to
the contras in Nicaragua.”
Turner devotes the final chapter to reflections on the 2005 Intelligence Reform Act. “The big question, then, is
whether President Bush will line up with
the presidents since FDR who have favored giving more authority to the DCI
or whether he will give in to the Defense
Department’s persistent efforts to keep
the DCI’s authority limited.” Noting that
“the CIA’s reputation in the country is at
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a nadir today,” Turner calls for “the dissolution of the CIA” as part of “a bold
transformation” of U.S. intelligence.
The 444 endnotes citing interviews,
NARA files, articles, and many books
prove that Turner has maintained a
scholar’s interest in the field he once
practiced. A surprise may be that no
endnote cites John Ranelagh’s The
Agency or any book written by Jeffrey
Richelson—or perhaps Langley’s reviewers extirpated every one of them.
TOM GRASSEY

Naval War College

Herrick, Robert Waring. Soviet Naval Doctrine
and Policy 1956–1986. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin
Mellen, 2003. 3 vols., 1,415 pp. $129.95, $129.95,
$139.95

It is no accident that each volume in
this set comes with Fleet Admiral Sergei
Gorshkov’s picture on the cover. In
fact, the time period encompassed by
this trilogy coincides precisely with the
Gorshkov era—the central figure in all
of the strategic and doctrinal debates of
this study. This massive series is the
capstone achievement of Robert Waring
Herrick, a former U.S. naval attaché to
the Soviet Union and an experienced
student of Soviet navy development.
The subject, the Soviet navy’s growth
from a small coastal force into a balanced force capable of contesting the
United States for command of the seas,
is similarly the capstone achievement of
Admiral Gorshkov, who played a key
role in its development. Appointed
chief of the Soviet navy in 1956, he
took the job surrounded by an armyoriented general staff and the political
leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, who
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was obsessed with missiles and nuclear
weaponry. Over his thirty-year tenure
Gorshkov brought the Soviet navy “into
the world ocean” and seriously challenged American-led Western supremacy at sea. From the official Soviet
perspective, this work dissects the
smaller debates that attended this
growth: coastal versus oceangoing;
offensive versus defensive; submarines
versus balanced fleet; navy nuclear first
strike versus strategic reserve.
If one follows the maxim that “budgets
are strategy,” Gorshkov comes out the
clear winner in his competition within
the Soviet bureaucracy, ultimately building not only a bigger navy, but also a
“balanced” blue-water force. In fact, the
book would offer additional insights if it
managed to relate official pronouncements with actual building programs.
This would lay to rest the speculation
made throughout the book that some of
these official pronouncements were unvarnished reality while others were exaggerations or Aesopian fables in which
the Navy lobbied for forces as projections of Western successes.
The most useful contributions this
study offers are found as Gorshkov
evaluates and assesses the effect of the
growing U.S. Navy during the Reagan
administration. Most notably, Herrick
shows that Western practices were the
foundation upon which Gorshkov built
his navy. The Lehman “Oceanic Strategy” of the early 1980s gave a second
wind to Moscow’s shipbuilding program. Herrick also reveals the complete
disutility of using “dissuasion” as part
of a deterrence strategy with the Soviets. Could a nation ever build a navy so
large that the nearest competitor simply
was dissuaded from trying to keep up?
Reflecting classical balance of power
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